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This paper analyzes the welfare costs of business cycles when workers face uninsurable job displacement
risk that has a cyclical component. Using a simple general equilibrium model with incomplete markets, this
paper shows the following result: for suﬃciently high degree of risk aversion (at least one), cyclical variations
in the long-term earnings losses of displaced workers can generate arbitrarily large cost of business cycles
even if the second moments of the distribution of individual income changes are constant over the cycle.
Thus, the previous literature, which has either disregarded long-term earnings losses of displaced workers
or dealt with them only indirectly using second-moment analysis, might have severely under-estimated the
welfare cost of business cycles. In addition to the theoretical analysis, this paper also conducts a quantitative
study of the cost of business cycles using empirical evidence on the long-term earnings losses of U.S. workers.
The quantitative analysis suggests that cyclical variations in job displacement risk generate sizable cost of
business cycles.
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In a highly inﬂuential contribution, Lucas (1987) argues that standard macroeconomic
theory implies that the welfare cost of business cycles is negligible. In other words, Lucas
(1987) argues that from a welfare point of view, business cycle research and counter-cyclical
stabilization policy are irrelevant. His argument is based on a representative-agent model
with no production and “standard” preferences. More speciﬁcally, Lucas (1987) assumes that
i) there is no uninsurable idiosyncratic risk (complete markets), ii) there is no link between
business cycles and economic growth, and iii) preferences allow for a time-additive expected
utility representation with moderate degree of (relative) risk aversion. In principle, any one
of these three assumptions could be questioned, and an extensive literature has subsequently
studied how weakening these assumptions could change the surprisingly strong conclusion
drawn by Lucas (1987). In his recent survey, Lucas (2003) summarizes the ﬁndings of this
literature in the following way: “But I argue in the end that, based what we know now, it
is unrealistic to hope for gains larger than a tenth of a percent from better countercyclical
policy”.
This paper removes the complete-markets assumption made by Lucas (1987), and argues
that the introduction of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor market risk (incomplete markets)
generates substantial welfare costs of business cycles. In accordance with the previous liter-
ature, this paper takes as a starting point of the analysis the observation that idiosyncratic
labor market risk has a cyclical component (labor income risk is high during recessions), and
assumes that the elimination of business cycles leads to the elimination of the cyclical ﬂuctu-
ations in idiosyncratic labor market risk. In contrast to the previous literature, however, this
paper broadens the scope of the analysis. More precisely, job displacement risk can increase
during a recession for the following three reasons: i) an increase in the job displacement rate,
ii) a rise in the unemployment duration, and iii) an increase in the long-term earnings losses
1of displaced workers1 The previous literature has either conﬁned attention to i) and ii) or
dealt with iii) only indirectly using a second-moment approach. In this paper, we study iii)
and explicitly take into account that the second moment (variance) of log-income changes
might be a bad measure of risk if job displacement is a rare event with severe consequences.
The paper presents two results, one theoretical and one empirical, that suggest that cycli-
cal variations in the long-term earnings losses of displaced workers generate cost of business
cycles that are substantially larger than the cost reported by the previous literature. First,
this paper shows that for suﬃciently high degree of risk aversion (at least one), the cost of
business cycles can be arbitrarily large even if job displacement rates, unemployment dura-
tions, and the second moments of the distribution of individual income shocks are constant
over the cycle. Intuitively, if the long-term earnings losses of displaced workers strongly
increase during recessions, then the cost of business cycles might be very large even if the
variance of the distribution of income changes is (almost) constant over the cycle.2 Thus,
the previous literature, which has either neglected the long-term earnings losses of displaced
workers or dealt with them only indirectly using second-moment analysis, may have severely
under-estimated the cost of business cycles.
In addition to the theoretical analysis, this paper also provides a ﬁrst quantitative analy-
sis of the welfare eﬀects of cyclical ﬂuctuations in job displacement risk. More speciﬁcally,
this paper uses evidence about job displacement rates and the long-term earnings losses of
displaced U.S. workers obtained by the empirical literature to calibrate the model economy,
and then computes the cost of business cycles for the calibrated version of the model. The
1See, for example, Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and Hall (1995) for empirical evidence on the cyclical
behavior of job displacement rates and unemployment duration. See section IV.1. for a survey of the empircal
literature on the long-term earnings losses of displaced workers.
2Krebs (2004) uses a similar idea to show that any arbitrage-free asset return process is an equilibrium
outcome for given preferences and given process of ﬁrst and second moments of individual income changes.
2quantitative analysis shows that cyclical ﬂuctuations in job displacement risk generate siz-
able welfare cost of business cycles. For example, in the baseline economy with log-utility
preferences (degree of risk aversion of one), the welfare cost of business cycles for high-tenure
workers is around half a percentage point of lifetime consumption, and this cost increases to
one percentage point if we assume a degree of relative risk aversion of two. In contrast, for
the same economy with no cyclical ﬂuctuations in the earnings losses of displaced workers,
the welfare cost of business cycles is nil. Moreover, the implied cyclical variations in the sec-
ond moments of the distribution of individual income shocks are so small that a log-normal
view of the world would suggest negligible cost of business cycles.
At this stage, it is worth pointing out that the results reported here do not necessarily
imply that macroeconomic stabilization policy leads to substantial welfare gains. For ex-
ample, the current paper follows Lucas (1987) and disregards any link between short-run
ﬂuctuations in aggregate output (business cycles) and the mean of aggregate output (eco-
nomic growth).3 Moreover, in accordance with the previous literature, this paper uses a
“black-box” approach to the elimination of business cycles in the sense that it does not
explicitly model the interaction between counter-cyclical stabilization policy and the busi-
ness cycle. More speciﬁcally, this paper follows recent contributions to the literature (Krebs
2003a, Krusell and Smith, 1999, Lucas, 2003) and uses the “integration principle” in order
to remove cyclical variations in idiosyncratic risk. For the speciﬁc case considered in this
paper, the integration principle implies that cycle-dependent earnings losses are replaced by
cycle-independent earnings losses with the same mean. Despite these limitations, the current
analysis seems well-suited for addressing the issue that is the topic of Lucas (2003), namely
3For example, the elimination of business cycles might aﬀect the aggregate stock of physical capital
(Krusell and Smith, 1999) or human capital (Krebs, 2003a) in the economy. Moreover, business cycles aﬀect
the re-allocation of factors across heterogenous production units, which in turn aﬀects aggregate economic
growth. See, for example, Haltiwanger (2000) for a recent survey of the theoretical and empirical literature
on the growth eﬀects of factor re-allocation.
3whether our current theoretical and empirical knowledge suﬃces to rule out substantial wel-
fare cost of business cycles. As shown in this paper, sizable cost of business cycles cannot
be ruled out once we take into account the long-term earnings losses of displaced workers.
Finally, a comment regarding modeling strategy is in order. The objective of the current
paper is to study the welfare eﬀects of business cycles when workers face uninsurable job
displacement risk. As it is well-known, equilibria of incomplete-market models with idiosyn-
cratic risk and aggregate shocks are in general diﬃcult to compute and (almost) impossible
to analyze theoretically. In order to focus on the main economic issues, the analysis pre-
sented here is therefore based on a highly tractable incomplete-market model along the lines
of Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) and Krebs (2004). The model is simple enough to allow
for the derivation of simple and transparent expressions for the welfare cost of business cy-
cles, yet rich enough to establish a tight link between the theoretical earnings process and
the empirical literature on job displacement risk.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section II surveys the previous literature. Section
III develops the model that is used to discuss the eﬀect of job displacement risk on the
welfare cost of business cycles. Section IV derives a closed-form expression for the welfare
cost of business cycles, and uses these expressions to prove the main theoretical result:
cyclical ﬂuctuations in job displacement risk may have an arbitrarily large eﬀect on the
cost of business cycles even if there is no employment risk and the second moments of the
distribution of income shocks have no cyclical component (proposition 2). Section V provides
an extensive review of the empirical literature on job displacement risk. The results of this
4An alternative approach would be to use preferences and estimates of the process of individual con-
sumption risk to derive the welfare cost of business cycles. Although in general quite attractive, such an
approach has the drawback that the empirical literature on labor market risk has mainly focused on cyclical
variations in individual income risk (for an important exception, see Brav, Constantinides, and Gescy, 2002).
Put diﬀerently, we know much more about cyclical variations in individual income risk than we know about
cyclical variations in individual consumption risk.
4literature are used to calibrate the process of job displacement risk, and the calibrated
model economy is then used to analyze the quantitative eﬀect of cyclical ﬂuctuations in job
displacement risk on the cost of business cycles. Section VI concludes.
II. Previous Literature
We now brieﬂy survey the literature on the cost of business cycles in models with incom-
plete markets. Most of the previous literature has focused on quantitative results derived
from analyzing calibrated model economies.
Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Imrohoroglu (1989), and Krusell and Smith (1999,2002)
all study models of worker unemployment, and assume that cyclical ﬂuctuations in unem-
ployment rates and unemployment durations are the only sources of cyclical variations in
idiosyncratic labor market risk, but assume that the earnings of displaced workers fully re-
cover after re-employment at a new job. Thus, they rule out by assumption the type of eﬀect
studied here. Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) extent the analysis of unemployment
risk and allow for endogenous search. In this case, business cycles may have a positive eﬀect
on welfare (option value of search).5
The papers by Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) and Krusell and Smith (1999,2002)
employ versions of the neoclassical model with aggregate productivity shocks that generate
cyclical ﬂuctuations in the aggregate wage, and in this sense these papers take into account
cyclical ﬂuctuations in the income losses of displaced workers. However, in the calibrated
model economies considered by these authors, the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the aggregate wage
have relatively low persistence and small amplitude, and therefore do not generate sizable
5See also Manuelli, Jones, Siu, and Staccetti (2003) and Jovanovic (2003) for representative-agent models
in which aggregate ﬂuctuations have a positive eﬀect on growth.
5cost of business cycles.6 Beaudry and DiNardo (2001) consider a model of unemployment
in which the wage of new hires varies over the business cycle, and argue that these cyclical
variations are much more persistent and stronger than the cyclical variations in the aggregate
wage. In this sense, the analysis conducted in Beaudry and DiNardo (2001) is closely related
to the current analysis. However, in contrast to Lucas (2003) and most of the work in the
literature, Beaudry and Page (2001) simply assume that the elimination of business cycles
eliminates all idiosyncratic risk, and this assumption makes it diﬃcult to judge to what
extent the welfare cost reported in Beaudry and Pages (2001) are truly cost of business
cycle.
Krebs (2003a) and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001) discuss the cost of business
cycles when individual income shocks are (log)-normally distributed and the variance of
these shocks depend on business cycle conditions, but they do not condition on the job
displacement event. According to the model analyzed in this paper, log-income changes are
only normally distributed after we condition on the individual job displacement event (and
business cycles conditions). In a certain sense, the models considered by Krebs (2003a) and
Storesletten et al. (2001) are mis-speciﬁed. The subsequent analysis will show that this
type of mis-speciﬁcation can lead to a serious under-estimate of the cost of business cycles
(proposition 3).7
Finally, Krebs (2003b) and Rogerson and Schindler (2002) study the welfare cost of job
displacement risk and also focus on the income losses of displaced workers. However, Krebs
(2003b) and Rogerson and Schindler (2002) analyze the welfare gain from eliminating job
displacement risk in an economy with constant job displacement risk, whereas the current
paper studies the welfare gains from eliminating the cyclical variations in job displacement
6Similarly, the cyclical ﬂuctuations in unemployment durations considered by these authors introduce
cyclical variations in the income losses of displaced workers.
7Comment that results have changed.
6risk (keeping average job displacement risk constant).
III. Model
The model is an incomplete-market version of the Lucas asset pricing model (Lucas, 1978)
similar to the one considered in Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) and Krebs (2004).8 It pro-
vides a formal approach to the intuitive idea that consumption equals permanent income.
The model features ex-ante identical, long-lived households (workers) with homothetic pref-
erences that make consumption/saving choices in the face of uninsurable income shocks.
Income shocks are permanent, which implies that self-insurance is an ineﬀective means to
smooth out income ﬂuctuations. Indeed, the economy is set up in a way so that in equi-
librium households will not self-insure at all. That is, income shocks translate one-to-one
into consumption changes (proposition 1). Notice that the result that permanent income
shocks have large eﬀects on consumption does not depend on the assumption that aggre-
gate saving is zero, even though we will make it to simplify the analysis. For example,
Krebs (2003a,2003b) considers a production economy with only permanent income shocks
(log-income follows a random walk) and ex-ante identical households, and shows again that
self-insurance is highly ineﬀective.9 Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997) provide a partial equi-
librium analysis of the eﬀect of permanent income shocks on consumption and saving, and
also conclude that the main eﬀect of permanent income shocks is to change consumption.
8To simplify the analysis, the current paper does not allow for assets in positive net supply. See Con-
stantinides and Duﬃe (1996) and Krebs (2004) for an extension of the model to this case. In the appendix,
we also consider a version of the model with two groups of workers (low- and high-tenure workers) who face
diﬀerent degrees of job displacement risk.
9One implication of the random walk assumption is that the cross-sectional distributions of income
and consumption diverge. However, Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) show how to modify the model by
introducing death probabilities so that a stationary distribution of income and consumption always exists.
Indeed, they show that by choosing the death probabilities appropriately, the model can match any cross-
sectional distribution of income and consumption.
7There is strong empirical evidence that individual labor income risk has a substantial
permanent (or highly persistent) component,10 and the empirical estimates of this perma-
nent component will be used in the quantitative section (section IV) to calibrate the model
economy. The same empirical literature also provides clear evidence in favor of a substantial
transitory component of labor income risk, and in this sense the current model is not consis-
tent with a certain dimension of the data. More speciﬁcally, the job displacement event has
two eﬀects on the earnings of a displaced worker. First, the worker goes through a period
of unemployment with no earnings (the transitory eﬀect). Second, the worker ﬁnds a new
job, but receives a permanently lower wage (the permanent eﬀect). In the current paper, we
disregard the ﬁrst eﬀect, and only focus on the second eﬀect. Given that the ﬁrst eﬀect has
been extensively studied by the previous literature (Atkeson and Phelan (1994), Imrohoroglu
(1989), Krusell and Smith (1999,2002)), this modeling choice seems appropriate.
III.1. Economy
Time is discrete and open ended. Labor income of worker i in period t is denoted by yit.
Labor income is random and deﬁned by an initial level yi0 and the law of motion
yi,t+1 =( 1+g)(1 + θi,t+1)(1 + ηi,t+1)yit , (1)
where g is the (constant) aggregate growth rate of labor income and θi,t+1 and ηi,t+1 describe
shocks to the labor income of worker i.11 We assume that for each i and t, the two random
variable θi,t+1 and ηi,t+1 are independently distributed. Further, we assume that the sequence
of random variables {θit} is i.i.d. across workers and over time with log-normal distribution
10See, for example, Carroll and Samwick (1997), Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004), Ruhm (1991), and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004).
11Notice that we do not allow the growth rate g to vary over the business cycle. Thus, any welfare cost of
business cycles reported here are solely due to cyclical variations in idiosyncratic labor market risk.
8function:12
log(1 + θi,t+1) ∼ N(−σ
2/2,σ
2) . (2)
The sequence of random variables {ηit} is also i.i.d. across workers, but not over time. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that there is an aggregate state process {St} that is i.i.d., and that
the distribution of ηit depends on the aggregate state of the economy in the following way:
ηi,t+1 =
 
−dS with probability pS if St+1 = S
pSdS
1−pS with probability (1 − pS) if St+1 = S, (3)
The random variable ηit is the cyclical component of labor income risk, and we interpret
this component as describing job displacement risk. The number dS is the (permanent)
income loss of a worker who is displaced when the aggregate state is S, and the number
pS is the corresponding displacement probability. For simplicity, we have assumed that all
displaced workers experience the same income loss dS. However, our analysis remains un-
changed if we assume that the income losses of displaced workers are log-normally distributed
with mean dS and constant variance since this formulation is observationally equivalent to
the current formulation. Notice that we have also assumed that the worker gains income
pS
1−pSdS if he is not displaced in order to ensure that the random variable ηit has mean zero.
Finally, the i.i.d. assumption means that income changes associated with the displacement
event are unpredictable, which implies that the corresponding income losses are permanent.
The income losses of displaced workers, and in particular its permanent component, have
been extensively studied by the empirical literature (Faber (1997), Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan (1993), Neal (1995), Ruhm (1991), Topel (1991)). Notice also that the speciﬁcation
(3) allows the size of the income loss of displaced workers to have a cyclical component (dS
12Note that it is standard in the literature (Carroll (1997), Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996), and Storeslet-
ten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001)) to introduce the extra term −σ2/2, which ensures that the mean of
income growth is independent of σ2. More precisely, speciﬁcation (2) implies that E[θi,t+1]=0a n d
var[θi,t+1]=eσ
2
− 1 using the standard formula for log-normal distributions. Thus, any increase in σ2
increases var[θi,t+1], but leaves E[θi,t+1] unchanged.
9depends on S), something that ﬁnds support in the data (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993)), and is particularly important from the point of view of the current paper. In sec-
tion V we will discuss the empirical literature on job displacement risk in more detail, and
use the estimates of job displacement risk obtained by this literature to calibrate the model
economy.
The random variable θit is the a-cyclical component of labor income risk, and we interpret
it as containing any labor income risk beyond job displacement risk. To relate this variable
to the empirical literature, let us take logs in equation (1):
logyi,t+1 = logyit + log(1 + g)+log(1 + θi,t+1)+log(1 + ηi,t+1) . (4)
Equation (4) says log-labor income approximately follows a random walk with drift and het-
eroscedastic error term  i,t+1 = log(1 + θi,t+1)+log(1 + ηi,t+1), which is yet another way of
saying that income shocks are permanent. An extensive empirical literature has estimated
the parameters of the permanent component of income shocks under the log-normal distribu-
tion assumption13 and the estimates obtained by this literature can be used to ﬁnd a value of
var((logyi,t+1 −logyit)), and therefore indirectly a value for var(log(1+θi,t+1)) = σ2 in (2).
Notice, however, that even though two recent contributions by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)
and Storesletten et al. (2004) have allowed the variance of log-income changes to depend
on the aggregate state S, this literature (in contrast to the literature on job displacement
mentioned above) has not conditioned their estimates on the displacement event and has not
taken into account any deviations from the log-normal distribution assumption.14 Clearly, if
13See, for example, Carroll and Samwick (1997), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), and Storesletten, et al.
(2004). Notice that even though Storesletten, et al. (2004) specify the permanent component to be AR(1),
they estimate an autocorrelation coeﬃcient close to one (the random walk case).
14Geweke and Keane (2000) allow for deviations from the log-normal distribution assumption. In contrast
to Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Storesletten et al. (2004), however, they do not condition their estimates
of the labor income parameters on the aggregate state of the economy and they do not decompose labor
income risk into a transitory and a permanent component.
10the speciﬁcation (4) is correct, then the error term  i,t+1 = log(1 + θi,t+1)+log(1 + ηi,t+1)i s
not normally distributed (indeed, it is the mixture of two normal distributions with diﬀerent
means), which implies that one of the identifying assumptions of this literature is violated.
Each worker begins life with no initial ﬁnancial wealth. Workers have the opportunity to
borrow and lend (dissave and save) at the risk-free rate rt. There are no insurance markets
for idiosyncratic labor income risk. In other words, there are no assets with payoﬀs that,
conditional on the aggregate state S, are correlated with either θit or ηit. Thus, the sequential
budget constraint of worker i reads:15
ai,t+1 =( 1 + rt)ait + yit − cit (5)
ai,t+1 ≥− M,a i0 =0.
Here cit denotes consumption of household i in period t and ait his asset holdings (wealth
excluding current interest payments) at the beginning of period t.T h e r e a l n u m b e r M
represents an explicit debt constraint that rules out Ponzi schemes.
Workers have identical preferences that allow for a time-additive expected utility repre-
sentation:
U({cit})=E






Moreover, we assume that the one-period utility function, u,i sg i v e nb yu(c)=c1−γ
1−γ ,f o r
γ  =1a n du(c)=logc for γ = 1. That is, we assume that preferences exhibit constant
degree of relative risk aversion γ.




1−γ(1 + θi,t+1)(1 + ηi,t+1)
 1−γ 
(7)
15Notice that the analysis remains unchanged if we assume that agents have the opportunity to trade assets
whose payoﬀs depend on the aggregate state S (Krebs, 2004). Our assumption that there are no insurance
markets means that one should interpret yit as income after transfer payments from the government.
















where πS is the probability that aggregate state S occurs. This inequality will ensure that in
equilibrium the expected lifetime utility of workers is ﬁnite for any budget-feasible plan, and
that any solution to the Euler equation also solves a corresponding transversality condition.
Notice that this condition is automatically satisﬁed if γ = 1 (log-utility).
III.2. Equilibrium
For a given interest rate process {rt}, each household chooses a consumption-saving plan
that maximizes expected lifetime utility (6) subject to the budget constraint (5). In equi-





Notice that (5) and (8) imply goods market clearing (Walras’ law).
The Euler equations associated with the consumption-saving problem of worker i read
c
−γ
it = β(1 + rt+1)E[c
−γ
i,t+1|Fit] , (9)
where Fit represents the information that is available to household i in period t.I n t h e
following, we assume that Fit contains any variable that has been realized up to time t.I n
particular, it contains θit, ηit,a n dSt. The Euler equation (9) says that the marginal utility
cost of saving one more unit of the good is equal to the expected marginal utility gain of
doing so.
16The notation suggests that there are a ﬁnite number of households, but all propositions in this paper
remain valid for the case of a continuum of households.















Evaluating the expectations in (10) using (2) and (3) yields:
r =




















Given this interest rate, the Euler equation (9) is satisﬁed if workers consume all their income:
cit = yit.17 If cit = yit,t h e nait = 0 (budget constraint). In Krebs (2004) it is shown that the
consumption-saving plan cit = yit and ait = 0 also satisﬁes a corresponding transversality
condition if the interest rate is given by (11). Thus, it maximizes expected lifetime utility.
Clearly, the choice ait = 0 also satisﬁes the market clearing condition (8). Thus, we have
found an equilibrium.
The result that equilibrium consumption equals income,cit = yit, means that equilibrium
welfare (expected lifetime utility), U,i sg i v e nb y :
U . = E












Using the preference speciﬁcation (6) and the deﬁnition of the income process (1)-(3), direct









((1 + g)1−γ(1 + θi)(1 + ηi))






(1 − β)2E [log((1 + g)(1 + θi)(1 + ηi))] if γ =1 .
Using the distributional assumption (2) and (3), we can evaluate the expectations in (13)
17Notice that here we use the fact that θit and ηit do not predict future idiosyncratic shocks to income.
T h a ti s ,w eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a t( θit,η it)a n d( θi,t+1,η i,t+1) are uncorrelated. Without this assumption,































πS [pS log(1 − dS)+( 1− pS)log(1 + pSdS/(1 − pS))]
 
.
We summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The consumption-saving plan {ait,c it},w h e r eait =0a n dcit = yit,i n
conjunction with the interest rate process (9) constitute an equilibrium. Welfare (expected
lifetime utility) of workers in this equilibrium is given by (13), respectively (14).
IV. Cost of Business Cycles: Qualitative Analysis
In this section, we use the model laid out in section III to derive an explicit formula for the
welfare cost of business cycles (proposition 2). Using this welfare expression, we then show
the main theoretical result, namely that the cost of business cycles might be arbitrarily large
even if the second moments of the distribution of individual income changes are constant over
the business cycle (proposition 3). Indeed, the result we prove here is somewhat stronger in
the sense that our proof assumes that job displacement probabilities are constant over the
cycle. In other words, cyclical ﬂuctuations in the earnings losses of displaced workers are
suﬃcient to prove the result.
IV.1. Eliminating Business Cycles
We begin this section with a discussion of how the elimination of business cycles aﬀects
the nature of idiosyncratic risk. In our model, the elimination of business cycles amounts
to moving from an economy with ﬂuctuations in the aggregate state S (the economy with
14business cycles) to an economy with constant S (the economy without business cycles). In
other words, we are moving from an economy with income risk deﬁned by the S-independent
distribution of income shocks θi and S-dependent distribution of income shocks ηi to an
economy with income risk deﬁned by the S-independent distributions of income shocks ¯ θi
and ¯ ηi. The question that arises is how to ﬁnd the distributions of ¯ θi and ¯ ηi given the
distributions of θi and ηi. Following Lucas (1987) and the subsequent literature, we will
answer this question without an explicit model of the interaction between macroeconomic
stabilization policy and the business cycle.
For economies without uninsurable idiosyncratic risk (complete markets), Lucas (1987)
postulates that the elimination of business cycles amounts to replacing all S-dependent
economic variables by their mean value. That is, we take the expectations over S. Extending
this approach to economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk (incomplete markets), we
postulate that eliminating business cycles means that we replace all S-dependent economic
variables by their expected value with respect to S conditional on the idiosyncratic state of
an individual worker. This “integration principle” has been used by several previous authors
(Krebs (2003a), Krusell and Smith (1999,2002), and Lucas (2003)). For economic variables
that have no S-dependence, the integration principle implies that the elimination of business
cycles has no eﬀect. Thus, for the a-cyclical component of individual income shocks we have
¯ θi = θi, and therefore







For the cyclical component of income shocks, ηi, the integration principle reads:
¯ ηi = E [ηi|si] , (16)
where si =0i fw o r k e ri is not displaced and si =1i fw o r k e ri is displaced. Taking the
expectations in (16) yields:
¯ ηi =
 
−¯ d with probability ¯ p
¯ p¯ d
1−¯ p with probability (1 − ¯ p)
, (17)












Equation (17) and (18) show that the application of the integration principle (16) to
the current model requires that we use the conditional probabilities prob(S|si =1 )=
pS
¯ p πS
to calculate the expected value of the income losses dS. Alternatively, we could use the









Equation (19) seems plausible if the earnings losses d are a linear function of aggregate
GDP (growth), and if, as in Lucas (1987), we assume that the elimination of business cycles
amount to replacing stochastic GDP (growth) by its (unconditional) mean. Notice that (18)
and (19) are only the same if job displacement rates are constant: pS =¯ p. However, even
in cases in which (18) and (19) diﬀer from each other, it turns out that the main theoretical
results derived in this paper (proposition 2 and 3 below) are valid regardless of the choice
that we make. In contrast, the quantitative results will be aﬀected. Since both (18) and
(19) seem plausible, in section V we report all quantitative welfare results for both cases.
IV.2. Cost of Business Cycles
Equations (18), respectively (19), shows how the elimination of business cycles aﬀect the
labor income process. We can use this information in conjunction with our welfare formula
(13) to calculate the welfare cost of business cycles. More precisely, we deﬁne the welfare
16cost of business cycles as the number ∆ that solves
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where cit is consumption in the economy with business cycles and ¯ cit is consumption in the
economy without business cycles. That is, we deﬁne the welfare cost of business cycles as
the percentage of consumption in each date-event that workers have to receive in order to
be fully compensated for the cyclical variations in labor income risk. Using the deﬁnition
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Several facts about (22) are noteworthy. First, the cost of business cycles is the same for
all worker. This is a result of the joint assumption of homothetic preferences and permanent
income shocks with a distribution that is independent of workers’ characteristics. Second,
if we use equation (18) to eliminate business cycles, then the welfare cost of business cycles
is non-negative: ∆ ≥ 0. This fact immediately follows from the concavity of the utility
function in conjunction with the fact that ηi is a mean-preserving spread of ¯ ηi. Thus, cyclical
variations in idiosyncratic labor income risk never decrease the welfare cost of business cycles.
17If pS and dS are positively correlated, then one can show that the same result holds even if we
use (19) to eliminate business cycles. Moreover, and more importantly, regardless of which
of the two methods is chose to eliminate business cycles, the cost of business cycles is nil,
∆ = 0, if the income losses of displaced workers are constant: dS = ¯ d for all aggregate states
S. This last result immediately follows from the welfare expression (22) using either (18) or
(19). Thus, if the only source of cyclical ﬂuctuations in labor income risk is state-dependent
displacement probabilities, then the introduction of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor market
risk does not change the cost of business cycles. Similar neutrality results have been derived
in Atkeson and Phelan (1994) and Krebs (2003a).
Proposition 2. The welfare cost of business cycles is given by (22). The cost of business
cycles is nil, ∆ = 0, if income losses of displaced workers have no cyclical component: dS = ¯ d
for all aggregate states S. That is, cyclical ﬂuctuations in job displacement probabilities by
themselves do not generate cost of business cycles.
Proposition 2 shows that there is not much hope for generating cost of business cycles
through cyclical variations in job displacement probabilities only. Matters are diﬀerent,
however, once we allow for cyclical variations in the income losses of displaced workers:
dS  = dS  for some pair of aggregate states S  = S . Inspection of (22) suggests that we have
∆ →∞when dS → 1f o rs o m eS if γ ≥ 1. That is, for high enough degree of risk aversion,
the cost of business cycles becomes arbitrarily large when the income losses of displaced
workers during certain macroeconomic conditions (recessions) become arbitrarily large. In
the appendix, we show that this result still holds even if job displacement rates and the
second moments of the distribution of income changes are (almost) constant. The trick here
is to send simultaneously the displacement probability to zero, p → 0, and to do this in
a way so that the cost of business cycles is still growing without bounds, but the second
moments of the distribution of income shocks is (almost) not aﬀected. In short, we have the
18following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose the degree of relative risk aversion is large enough: γ ≥ 1.
Then there is a process of job displacement risk with constant job displacement rates so
that i) the cost of business cycles is arbitrarily large and ii) the second moments of the
distribution of individual income shocks are (almost) constant over the business cycle. More
precisely, denote the second moment of the distribution of individual income shocks by
var(yi,t+1/yit|St+1)=σ2
y(St+1) and assume γ ≥ 1.18 For any real numbers  >0a n d¯ ∆ > 0,
we can ﬁnd a process of job displacement risk with pS = p so that i) the implied cost of
business cycles is ∆ = ¯ ∆ and ii) the implied second moments of the distribution of income
shocks satisfy |σ2
y(S) − σ2
y(S )| < for all S,S .
V. Cost of Business Cycles: Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we analyze the quantitative importance of the main theoretical result
derived in the previous section (proposition 3). To this end, we ﬁrst discuss the calibration
of the model economy (section V.1), and then report the quantitative results (section V.2).
The economy we consider in this quantitative part is an extension of the basic model discussed
and analyzed in sections III and IV. It features two types of workers, high-tenure and low-
tenure workers (low- and high-risk workers), who face diﬀerent degrees of job displacement
risk. The details of the theoretical model with two types of workers are discussed in the
Appendix.
V.1. Calibration
Following the previous literature (Imrohoroglu, 1989, Krebs, 2003a, Krusell and Smith,
18The proposition still holds if we consider the variance of log-income changes, σ2
log y
. =
var(logyi,t+1 − logyit|St+1), but for this version of proposition 3 the conditions γ>1 is required.
191999, and Storesletten et al., 2001) we assume now that there are two aggregate states,
S = L,H, corresponding to low economic activity (economic contraction) and high economic
activity (economic expansion). We further follow the literature and disregard any asymmetry
in the business cycle, that is, we assume that on average both aggregate states have the same
likelihood of occurences. In our setting without persistence in the aggregate state process,
this means that πL = πH = .5. We choose the period length to be one year to be consistent
with the empirical work on labor market risk (see below). Thus, the choice of πL = πH = .5
implies an average duration of both good and bad times of two years, which is also the value
considered in Imrohoroglu (1989), Krebs (2003a), and Krusell and Smith (1999,2002). We
choose an average growth rate of labor income of g = .02.
For the model with two types of workers (the appendix), the process of job displacement
risk is deﬁned by the parameters psS and dsS,w h e r eS = L,H (economic contraction and eco-
nomic expansion) and s = l,h (low- and high-tenure workers). We choose these parameters
so that the model economy matches the ﬁrst and second moments of the job displacement
rate and the permanent earnings losses of corresponding group of U.S. displaced workers
that have been estimated by the empirical literature. That is, we try to match previous
estimates of i) the average probability of job displacement, ii) the cyclical variations of the
job displacement probabilities, iii) the average permanent earnings loss of displaced workers,
and iv) the cyclical variations in the permanent income loss of displaced workers. We now
turn to a discussion of the estimates of these moments by the empirical literature.
Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers
There are many studies of the long-term consequences of job displacement for U.S. work-
ers. One of the most detailed studies is Jacobsen et al. (1993), who use longitudinal data on
the earnings of high-tenure workers (workers with at least six years of tenure) in Pennsylva-
nia from 1974 to 1986 to estimate the earnings losses of displaced workers. In their restricted
20sample, they conﬁne attention to workers that are separated from distressed ﬁrms, where
they deﬁne a distressed ﬁrm as a ﬁrm that experienced an employment contraction of at
least 30%. For these workers, they ﬁnd a very large drop in earnings the year following the
displacement event (around 50%). Moreover, and more importantly from the point of view
of the current paper, these income losses have a sizable component that is highly persistent.
More speciﬁcally, even 6 years after separation the earnings of the displaced workers is 25%
below the earnings of workers with similar characteristics that have not been displaced. 19
The result that high-tenure, displaced workers experience a permanent earnings loss of about
25% is also consistent with other estimates in the empirical literature. For example, Topel
(1990) analyzes individual earnings data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
and estimates that displaced workers with at least 10 years of seniority prior to displacement
suﬀer a permanent income loss of 25%.20 In a similar vein, Kambourov and Manovskii (2002)
ﬁnd that ten years of occupational tenure increase wages by at least 19 percent.
Ruhm (1991) is another well-known study of the earnings losses of displaced workers.
He uses PSID data to estimate these losses, and ﬁnds that the long-term earnings losses are
substantial (10−13%), but signiﬁcantly lower than the 25% found by Jacobson et al. (1993).
Clearly, the two studies rely on diﬀerent data sets, and this could be one reason for the
diﬀerence in results. However, it is more likely that the divergence in results is mainly driven
by the fact that Jacobson et al (1993) conﬁne attention to high-tenure workers, whereas
19Jacobson et al. (1993) also consider a larger sample of workers that consists of all separated workers
including those who quit their job and those who get laid oﬀ due to “slack work”. For workers who quit,
we expect smaller earnings losses than before, and for workers who are laid oﬀ because of “slack work”, we
would expect higher earnings losses (Gibbon and Katz, 1991). Jacobson et al (1993) ﬁnd that the average
earnings losses of all separated workers are smaller than the earnings losses of workers that are displaced
because of mass lay-oﬀs, which suggest that the “quit-eﬀect” dominates.
20Topel (1990) and others in the literature interpret these results as a conﬁrmation of a human capital
theory in which workers invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, but recent work suggest that these losses
are mainly due to the destruction of industry-speciﬁc (Neal, 1995) or occupation-speciﬁc (Kambourov and
Manovskii, 2002) human capital. For a theoretical model of job separation with match-speciﬁc human
capital, see Jovanovic (1979).
21Ruhm (1991) does not split his sample. Clearly, any theory of match-speciﬁc or occupation-
/industry-speciﬁc human capital would suggest that high-tenure workers experience large
earnings losses upon displacement. This implication ﬁnds support in the study by Stevens
(1997), who ﬁnds signiﬁcant and large diﬀerence between the earnings losses of low- and
high-tenure workers. However, even though there is a stark diﬀerence between the earnings
losses of the two types of workers, it seems to be the case that even low-tenure workers
experience substantial long-term losses as a result of job displacement. For example, Lorie
and Farlie (2003) report that the young adult workers with only three years of labor market
experience suﬀer a permanent earnings loss of around 10 percent, a loss that is mainly due
to forgone earnings growth. Finally, we note that Farber (1997) uses evidence from the
Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) and estimates earnings losses of around 15 percent for a
sample that again includes both types of workers.
Based on the results described above, we choose a value of 25% for the average earnings
losses of hight-tenure workers. That is, we choose the parameters dhL and dhH so that the
restriction .5dhL + .5dhH = .25 is satisﬁed. Notice that both Krebs (2003b) and Rogerson
and Schindler (2002) use a similar value in their studies of the welfare consequences of job
displacement risk. For low-tenure workers, we assume an average earnings loss of 12%, which
yields .5dlL = .5dlH = .12%.
Another important issue is the degree to which the long-term earnings losses of displaced
workers depend on cyclical conditions. Jacobson et al (1993) ﬁnd strong evidence in favor
of the view that these earnings losses vary over the business cycle, again for their sample
of high-tenure workers. More speciﬁcally, they deﬁne the cyclical labor market condition
by the unemployment rate and the deviation from trend employment, and estimate that
workers who become displaced during the worst cyclical conditions experience a permanent
income loss of 37%, whereas this income loss is only 13% for those workers who experience job
22displacement during the best cyclical conditions (see table 2 and the corresponding discussion
in Jacobson et al., 1993). In other words, the spread is 37%−13% = 24%.21 Clearly, focusing
only on the most extreme cyclical conditions is overstating the cyclicality of income losses,
but these estimates indicate a very strong cyclical component. Weinberg (2001) considers
a sample of displaced workers of all tenure-levels (low- and high-tenure workers), and also
ﬁnds a very strong cyclical component of the long-term earnings losses. More speciﬁcally, he
ﬁnds that a one-standard deviation increase in industry growth increases post-displacement
wages by 4%.22 Thus, the spread between good and bad cyclical conditions is 8% if we focus
on one-standard deviations from the mean and 16% if we consider two-standard deviations
from the mean.
Work by Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994, Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), and Bils (1985)
providesadditional evidence in favor of the view that earnings losses of displaced workers
display a strong cyclical component. More speciﬁcally, Barsky and Solon (1989) and Bils
(1985) show that after controlling for selectivity bias, aggregate wages decrease by approxi-
mately 1−1.5% in response to a one percent increase in the unemployment rate. Moreover,
and more importantly for the current paper, Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) show that wages
of new hires decrease on average by approximately 3 − 4.5% for every percent increase in
the unemployment rate. Thus, assuming a spread of the unemployment rate of 5 percent
between economic contractions and economic expansions, the last ﬁnding implies a variation
21Note that empirical result regarding the cyclical variation of d reported by Jacobson et al. (1993)
are derived exploiting diﬀerences across local labor markets. Put diﬀerently, the result is mainly based on
cross-sectional variation, and the time-series inference drawn in this paper is therefore somewhat tentative.
22Weinberg (2001) exploits growth-rate diﬀerences across industries to identify the relationship between
cyclical conditions and earnings losses of displaced workers. Thus, as in the case of Jacobson et al (1993),
the business cycle implications of Weinberg’s ﬁnding are not clear-cut. Moreover, Weinberg (2001) inves-
tigates low-frequency shocks to industry growth, whereas the current paper is concerned with short-term
ﬂuctuations.
23of income losses over the cycle of somewhere between 15% and 22.5%.23 Clearly, this type
of evidence is silent about the persistence of income losses, but taken together with the evi-
dence reported in Jacobson et al. (1993) they make a strong case in favor of the view that
the permanent earnings losses of displaced workers have a large cyclical component.
Finally, we note that Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate that the skill-level of white-collar
workers depreciates by 30% for each year of unemployment. Combined with the fact that
unemployment durations increase during recessions (Blanchard and Diamond, 1990), this
ﬁnding provides additional evidence for the view that cyclical conditions aﬀect the long-
term losses of displaced workers.24 Notice that this eﬀect goes beyond the transitory eﬀect
of unemployment on earnings due to forgone wage payments.
Guided by the above evidence, we assume that for high-tenure workers, the diﬀerence
in the earnings looses of displaced workers between booms and recessions is 16%. That is,
we require that dhL − dhH = .16. Combined with the condition .5dhL + .5dhH, this yields
dhL = .33 and dhH = .17. For low-tenure workers, we assume a spread of dlL − dlH = .06,
w h i c hc o m b i n e dw i t ht h er e s t r i c t i o n.5dlL = .5dlH = .12 yields dlL = .15 and dlH = .09.
Job Displacement Rates
To complete the calibration of the job displacement process, we need to assign values for
the job displacement probabilities psS. Jacobson et al (1993) report that in their sample of
high-tenure workers, the fraction of workers that experience at least one job displacement
event due to mass layoﬀs is equal to 28 percent over a time span of 13 years (see table 1
23Notice that a 5 percent spread in the unemployment rate is consistent with the ﬂuctuations in the
U.S. unemployment rate over the last 30 years. Note also that Imrohoroglu (1989) and Krusell and Smith
(1999,2002) use a spread in the unemployment rate that is even larger.
24Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and Pissarides (1992) are two examples of papers in the macroeconomic
literature that heavily rely on this skill-depreciation eﬀect of unemployment.
24in Jacobson et al (1993)). Assuming that the job displacement event is i.i.d. over time,
this means that the probability of experiencing job displacement within a particular year is
equal to 1 − (1 − .28)1/13 = .025. An annual job displacement probability of 2.5%, however,
is likely to be an underestimate of the actual job displacement probability for the following
reasons. First, the sample of workers displaced by mass-layoﬀs constructed by Jacobson et
al. (1993) excludes many workers that ought to be counted as displaced workers, namely
all those workers who lost their jobs for “exogenous reasons” but worked for ﬁrms that did
not contract by at least 30 percent . Second, Jacobson et al. (1993) eliminate all displaced
workers who subsequently report no earnings, which in their sample is a very large fraction of
the total sample. The job displacement rates reported by Farber (1997), which are estimated
using the DWS data, avoid these shortcomings, and are in this sense more representative. For
male workers of age 35-44, Farber (1997) reports an average job displacement rate of .0384.
This is in accordance with the job displacement rates reported by Stevens (1997) using the
PSID data. Finally, we note that both the job displacement rates reported in the DWS and
the PSID are likely to be under-estimates of the true job displacement probabilities because
of recall bias (Topel, 1991). Finally, we note that measures of total rates of job loss are
much larger and lie somewhere in between a quarterly rate of 2 − 10% (Hall, 1995). In our
model economy, we choose the job displacement rates psS so that the mean annual rate is
3 percent for high-tenure workers and 4 percent for low-tenure workers. That is, we require
.5phL + .5phH = .03 and .5plL + .5plH = .04.
Jacobson et al. (1993) do not report the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the job displacement rates
in their data set. Using the DWS, Farber (1997) reports job displacement rates that have an
annualized standard deviation of .0061. Stevens (1997) ﬁnd similar variations in job displace-
ment rates over the cycle using the PSID data. In our baseline model, we require the standard
deviation of the job displacement rate for both high-tenure and low-tenure workers to be
equal to .005. That is, we impose the restriction
 
.5(phL − .03)2 + .5(phH − .03)2 = .005 and
25 
.5(plL − .04)2 + .5(plH − .04)2 = .005. Combining this with the restrictions .5phL+.5phH =
.03 and .5plL + .5plH = .04, we ﬁnd phL = .0035, phH = .0025, plL = .0045, and plH = .0035.
Finally, we choose the transition probability q so that the implied stationary distribution of
low- and high-tenure workers is (.5,.5). This yields q = .0312.
Other Earnings Risk
To complete the calibration of the labor income process, it remains to ﬁnd a value for the
variance var(log(1 + θi,t+1)) = σ2. To ﬁnd this value, notice ﬁrst that the average variance












πS var(log(1 + ηi,t+1)|S) .
As argued before (see equation 4), the variance term σ2
logy has been estimated by an ex-
tensive empirical literature. More speciﬁcally, the empirical literature on labor income risk
has often used a random walk speciﬁcation for the permanent component of labor income
(Carroll and Samwick, 1997, Gottschalk and Moﬃtt, 1994, and Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004),
or has used an AR(1) speciﬁcation and then estimated a serial correlation coeﬃcient close
to one (Storesletten et al., 2004). Thus, this literature provide a direct estimate of σ2
logy.
All the empirical studies use annual income data drawn from the PSID data set, and esti-
mate an average variance of permanent income shocks between .022 and .033 for the pooled
household/worker sample (a standard deviation between .15 and .18). In this paper, we
calibrate the income process so that the implied value for σ2
logy is equal to .022 (a standard
deviation of .15). Using the already assigned values for the displacement parameters pS and
dS, equation (21) pins down σ2. Using our previous values, we ﬁnd σ2 = .0207 (a standard
deviation of σ = .1438) using ηi,t+1 of high-tenure workers in (23).
Preference Parameters
26We choose the preference parameters as follows. We follow the bulk of the business cycle
literature and choose an annual discount factor of β = .96. In comparison, Imrohoroglu
(1989) also chooses β = .96, but Storesletten et al. (2001) pick β = .95. Krusell and Smith
(1999,2002) assume a stochastic discount factor with a mean of .95. For the degree of relative
risk aversion, the standard choice in the macroeconomic literature is γ = 1 (log-utility), and
this is also our choice for the baseline model. However, we also report the results for γ =1 .5
and γ = 2. In comparison, Krusell and Smith (1999,2002) use log-utility, Storesletten et al.
(2001) focus on γ = 4, and Imrohoroglu considers the two cases γ =1 .5a n dγ =6 .
Summary of Parameter Choices
To sum up, for the baseline economy we choose g = .02, πL = πH = .5, σ2 = .0207,
phL = .035, phH = .025, plL = .0045, plH = .0035, q = .0312, dL = .33, dH = .17, β = .96,
and γ = 1. Using equations (A11) and (A12) in the appendix, we ﬁnd that the implied
lending rate is r =3 .87% and the implied borrowing rate is rb =4 .01. In other words, the
spread is rb − r = .14%. This deﬁnes our baseline economy. However, we also consider the
eﬀect of an increase in risk aversion. When γ =1 .5, the implied lending and borrowing
rates become r =2 .89%, respectively rb =3 .11%. When γ =2 ,w eh a v er =1 .34% and
rb =1 .68%.
V.2. Results
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of our quantitative study. The ﬁrst column shows the
cost of business cycles for diﬀerent preferences parameters if business cycles are eliminated
according to equation (19). If β = .96 and γ = 1 (log-utility), which is the standard
assumption in the macroeconomic literature, we have a welfare cost of business cycles that
is equal to ∆ = .571% for high-tenure workers and ∆ = .303% for low-tenure workers.
In comparison, for the same preference parameters, Lucas (1987) ﬁnds ∆ = .05% using a
27representative-agent model. Thus, the cost of business cycles found here is roughly one order
of magnitude larger than the ones found in Lucas (1987). Notice also that in the current
model there are no ﬂuctuations in aggregate income, so that the cost of business cycles is
nil when markets are complete.
The next column shows the cost of business cycles when equation (18) is used to eliminate
business cycles. In this case, the cost of business cycles are somewhat lower than before
and roughly equal to the cost of business cycles when job displacement probabilities are
constant pL = pH (third column). Thus, introducing cyclical variations in job displacement
probabilities ampliﬁes the eﬀect of cyclical variations in the income losses of displaced workers
only by a sizable amount if we use the ﬁrst method to eliminate business cycles.
The fourth column shows the cost of business cycles when, incorrectly according to
the current paper, the researcher assumes that log-income changes are normally distrib-
uted. More precisely, according to the model, the standard deviation of log-income changes,
σ2
logy, varies between σlogy(L)=.1086 and σlogy(H)=.09862 for high-tenure workers and
σlogy(L)=.09713 and σlog y(H)=.09524 for low-tenure workers. In the fourth column of
tables 1 and 2, we consider a labor income process that has, conditional on the aggregate
state S, a symmetric two-state support, and choose the support so that we match the given
S-dependent standard deviations.25 The results reported in the fourth column show that
the cost of business cycles becomes negligible once the log-normal approach is taken. Put
diﬀerently, the cyclical variation in income risk as measure by variations in σlogy(S)a r es o
small that the implied cost of business cycles become negligible. More generally, if the true
distribution is not symmetric, then assuming symmetry as in Krebs (2003a) and Storesletten
et al. (2001) can lead to a serious under-estimation of the cost of business cycles.
25This is the two-state approximation of the normal distribution using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature
(Judd, 1998). The welfare results barely change if a four-state approximation is used, which suggests that
the two-state approximation is already very good.
28Tables 1 and 2 also show how the cost of business cycles changes when the degree of risk
aversion is varied. More speciﬁcally, we choose γ =1 .5a n dγ =2 .. The cost of business
cycles is increasing and convex in γ . For example, for high-tenure workers the cost of
business cycles is .571% if γ =1 ,.887% if γ =1 .5, and 1.37% if γ = 2. The convexity of the
cost of business cycles as a function of γ has been emphasized by Storesletten et al. (2001).
Finally, we provide a welfare calculation similar to the one made in Hall (1995) and cal-
culate the “welfare cost of recessions”. More speciﬁcally, the two approaches (18) and (19)
to the elimination of business cycles share one general feature that has been a fundamental
principle in the argument put forward by Lucas (1987,2003), namely that counter-cyclical
stabilization policy can only reduce the severity of recessions by making the good times less
attractive “by an equal amount”. For the representative-agent model analyzed in Lucas
(1987), this implicitly assumes that the relationship between government policy and macro-
economic variables (aggregate GDP) is linear. Moreover, for the incomplete-market model
analyzed here, it means in addition that the relationship between earnings losses and aggre-
gate GDP is linear. Any non-linearity would make both (18) and (19) invalid. In the most
extreme case, we could imagine a situation in which counter-cyclical stabilization policy can
eliminate recessions without aﬀecting economic booms. That is, we could imagine that in
the economy without business cycles we have ¯ p = pH and ¯ d = dH, and then use the welfare
formula (22) to compute ∆, which in this case might be called the “cost of recessions”.
Notice that this procedure does not, as in Hall (1995), compute the cost of one recessions,
but instead computes the welfare cost of all (future) recessions.
With preference parameters γ =1a n dβ = .96, we ﬁnd a cost of recessions of 1.939
percent of lifetime consumption for high-tenure workers and 1.109 percent for low-tenure
workers. If we increase the degree of risk aversion to γ = 2, the we ﬁnd ∆ = 3.408% for
high-tenure workers and ∆ = 1.774% for low-tenure workers. Thus, the cost of recessions
29is quite large indeed. Clearly, this “cost of recessions” is an upper bound on the “cost of
business cycles”.
VI. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the welfare costs of business cycles when workers face uninsurable job
displacement risk that has a cyclical component. Using a simple dynamic general equilibrium
model with incomplete markets, this paper shows the following: for suﬃciently high degree
of risk aversion (above one), the introduction of cyclical variations in the permanent earnings
losses of displaced workers can generate arbitrarily large cost of business cycles even if there
is no employment risk (displaced workers are immediately re-employed) and the second
moments of the distribution of individual income shocks are (almost) constant over the cycle.
In other words, the previous literature, which has either focused on cyclical ﬂuctuations in
employment risk or assumed that income changes of workers are (log)-normally distributed,
might have severely under-estimated the cost of business cycles. In addition to the theoretical
analysis, this paper also conducts a quantitative study of the cost of business cycles using
empirical evidence about the permanent earnings losses of displaced U.S. workers. The
quantitative analysis suggests that the cost of business cycles due to the cyclical variations
in job displacement risk is quite substantial.
30Appendix 1
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 .
We have
var[yi,t+1/yit|St+1]=var[(1+g)(1 + θi,t+1)(1 + ηi,t+1)|St+1]( A1)
=( 1 + g)
2var[θi,t+1 + ηi,t+1 + θi,t+1ηi,t+1|St+1],
=( 1 + g)
2 (var[θi,t+1|St+1]+var[ηi,t+1|S1+1]+var[θi,t+1ηi,t+1|St+1])
=( 1 + g)
2 (var[θi,t+1|St+1]+var[ηi,t+1|S1+1]+var[θi,t+1|St+1]var[ηi,t+1|St+1]) ,
where the third and fourth lines follow from cov [θi,t+1,η i,t+1|St+1]=0a n dE [θi,t+1|St+1]=
E [ηi,t+1|St+1]=0 .
To simplify the notation, we consider the case of two aggregate states: S = L,H.W e
further assume dH =0a n dpL = pH = p.26 That is, if St+1 = H,t h e nηi,t+1 =0 .T h u s ,f o r
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Take any  >0a n dd with 0 <d<1, and choose p =  
 +d2(1+g)2eσ2. Clearly, by construction
we have 0 <p<1a n d







26Notice that in this case, both approaches to the elimination of business cycles (18) and (19) lead to the
same result.
31That is, the choice of p =  
 +d2(1+g)2eσ2 ensures that the cyclical variation in the second
moments of the distribution of income growth rates is always equal to  , and therefore
arbitrarily small. We now show that for any number ¯ ∆ > 0 we can always ﬁnd a number d
with 0 <d<1 (and a corresponding number p =  
 +d2(1+g)2eσ2) so that the implied welfare
cost of business cycles is equal to ¯ ∆.
To simplify notation, introduce c =( 1+g)2eσ2 > 0, so that p =  
 +cd 2. Consider the cost
of business cycles (21) for γ>1 (the argument for the log-utility case is the same). Notice
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From the fact that ηi is a mean-preserving spread of ¯ ηi, it follows immediately that
¯ f( ,d) <f( ,d)( A7)







The last equation (A8) follows from the continuity of f in conjunction with f( ,0) = πL +
πH = 1, limd→−1 f( ,d)=+ ∞, and the fact that the right-hand-side of (A8) is strictly
32greater than one by assumption (7). Using (A5)-(A7) in the welfare expression (22) yields
the desired result, namely the existence of a d and p so that (A4) is satisﬁed and the cost of
business cycles is equal to ¯ ∆.
33Appendix 2
A Model with Low-Tenure and High-Tenure Workers
In this appendix, we extent the model discussed in section III to the case in which there
are two diﬀerent types of workers, low-tenure workers and high-tenure workers, who face
diﬀerent degrees of displacement risk.
Suppose that the income process of all workers is still given by (1). Assume further that





−dsS  with probability psS if sit = sa n dS t+1 = S
psSdsS
1−psS with probability (1 − psS) if St+1 = S, (A9)
where s = l if worker i is a low tenure worker in period t and s = h if he is a high-tenure
worker in period t. Clearly, high-tenure workers become low-tenure workers whenever they
are displaced. That is, the transition probability of moving from sit = h to si,t+1 = l if
St+1 = S is equal to phS. To keep the model tractable, we assume that low-tenure become
high-tenure workers in a stochastic fashion. That is, we assume that the probability of a
low-tenure worker becoming a high-tenure worker is the same for all low-tenure workers and
equal to q.
As in the basic model, we assume that workers can borrow and lend at a risk-free rate.
However, in contrast to section III, we now assume there are two distinct risk-free rates, a




(1 + r)ait + yit − cit if ait ≥ 0
(1 + rb)ait + yit − cit if ait < 0 (A10)
ai,t+1 ≥− M,a i0 =0
Finally, preference of all workers are given by (6).
We deﬁne an equilibrium as in section III. It is again straightforward to show that cit = yit











































































Here we assume that, without loss of generality, the right-hand-side of (A11) is smaller
than the right-hand-side of (A12). That is, we assume that the high-tenure workers are the
high-risk workers.
Given the allocation cit = yit, we can use the speciﬁcation of the labor income process
and preferences to compute welfare (expected lifetime utility) for each group of workers.

























































Equation (A13) can be directly solved by the methods of undetermined coeﬃcients. That
is, it is straightforward that Vs(yi)=as
y1−γ
1−γ solves (A13) if and only of the coeﬃcients as















































 ah =1 ,
where the constant c is given by:












− 1 , (A16)
where (al,a h) is the solutions to (A14) using state-dependent job displacement parameters
pS and dS (economy with business cycles) and (¯ al,¯ ah) is the solution to (A14) using state-
independent job displacement parameters ¯ p and ¯ d (economy without business cycles.
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39Table I. Cost of Business Cycles: High-Tenure Workers27
Model Method 1 Method 2 pL = pH log-normal
β = .96 ,γ=1 .571% .315% .312% .001%
β = .96 ,γ=1 .5 .887% .506% .502% .002%
β = .96 ,γ=2 1 .370% .808% .803% .004%
Table II. Cost of Business Cycles: Low-Tenure Workers28
Model Method 1 Method 2 pL = pH log-normal
β = .96 ,γ=1 .303% .166% .164% .001%
β = .96 ,γ=1 .5 .461% .260% .257% .002%
β = .96 ,γ=2 .743% .432% .426% .004%
27Cost of business cycles are expressed as percentage of lifetime consumption. Job displacement process
of high-tenure workers. The ﬁrst two columns assume displacement probabilities pL = .035 and pH = .025
and corresponding income losses of dL = .33 and dH = .17. Method 1 uses equation (19) and method 2
equation (18) to eliminate business cycles. The column pL = pH has constant displacement probabilities of
pL = pH = .03 using the same income losses.
28The ﬁrst column assumes displacement probabilities pL = .045 and pH = .035 and corresponding
income losses of dL = .15 and dH = .09. The column pL = pH has constant displacement probabilities of
pL = pH = .04 using the same income losses.
40